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Military Police

ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM

Summary. This pamphlet establishes information on procedures for implementation of protective measures against the threat of terrorism. It is totally applicable to the Army National Guard, and in part to the Air National Guard. In most cases, Air National Guard units and activities will be governed by the provisions of AFR 208-1/ANGR 208-1, and other applicable references noted in this publication.

Interim Changes. Interim changes to this regulation are not official unless authenticated by the Executive, NGB. Interim changes will be destroyed on

their expiration dates unless sooner rescinded or superseded.

Applicability. This regulation applies to the Army and Air National Guard, not withstanding any local or State laws.

Impact on the New Manning System. This regulation does not impact on the New Manning System.

Suggested Improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to NGB-MS, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310-2500.

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Chapter 1**General****1-1. Purpose**

The information outlined here is intended to provide guidance for developing an awareness to the terrorist threat, and the appropriate antiterrorism actions necessary for self-protection and physical security of personnel, equipment, and facilities. The National Guard's involvement in counter terrorism is covered in NGR 500-50/ANGR 335-01 and AFR 208-1/ANGR 208-1.

1-2. Scope

a. The worldwide threat of terrorism poses an ever-increasing threat against U.S. military forces, equipment, and facilities, and will be a threat in the future. Accordingly, planning for defense against terrorism must become routine during training, peacetime activities, and combat operations. Even though absolute protection against terrorist activities is not possible, there is much that can be accomplished in our efforts to minimize the threat.

b. Prudent judgment dictates that we take action now on those areas of vulnerability that can be managed without outside assistance (e.g., repairs to existing security fencing; relocating aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment; increase area vigilance; and awareness training); and follow this with an in-depth vulnerability analysis, identifying those major deficiencies for future funding consideration.

1-3. Responsibilities

a. Department of the Army (DA). Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) has overall staff responsibility for security of the Army and, as such, has overall responsibility for coordinating the Army's Terrorism Counteraction Program. Headquarters USAF/IGT is responsible for coordinating the Air Force's and ANG terrorism counteraction program. In November 1983, DA established the DA antiterrorism task force (DA ATTF) under the DCSOPS to review the terrorist threat to the Army worldwide,

and to recommend corrective antiterrorism and counter terrorism measures. At MACOM level and below, the DCSOPS/G-3/operations officer/S-3 has the overall staff responsibility for coordinating terrorism counteraction and for security assessments for terrorism.

b. State National Guard Headquarters.

(1) Appoints a terrorism counteraction (TC/A) officer who is responsible for coordinating on all terrorism counteraction requirements.

(2) Develops and maintains contact with NGB-MS, U.S. Army Military intelligence Group field office, supporting Air Force office of special investigations (AFOSI) detachments, FBI, and local law enforcement agencies relative to program.

(3) Develops an antiterrorism and bomb threat plan. Guidance for preparation of these plans is available in TC-19-16 as applicable to the National Guard. Appendix E of this pamphlet is a sample bomb threat plan. Since crisis management team and special reaction Team are not authorized in the Army National Guard, the plans should include instructions for obtaining the required reaction support from local law enforcement agencies or a nearby military installation.

(4) Directs the operations officer at each level to organize and supervise those assets necessary to plan and conduct assessments and provide a consolidated report to the commander.

(5) Conduct terrorism awareness training/briefing for all personnel. (The unit level security police will normally conduct this training for ANG units/activities.)

(6) Ensures each unit is provided a copy of FC 100-37-1.

(7) Promptly notifies the NGB of any terrorist activities: Duty hours - NGB-MS (AUTOVON 227-2252/9019, Nonduty hours/holidays - NGB duty officer (AUTOVON 225-2314 or AUTOVON 851-8100).

c. NGB divisions/field offices are responsible for--

(1) Program development/coordination - NGB-MS AUTOVON 227-2252; for ANG units-ANGSC/SE: AUTOVON 858-2574.

(2) Training/OPSEC - NGB-ARO:
AUTOVON 289-1720: for ANG units - NGB/
XO: AUTOVON 227-1382.

(3) COMSEC/SIGINT - NGB-IMA,
AUTOVON 289-1250

(4) Public Affairs - NGB-PA,
AUTOVON 225-0421

Additionally, ANG units will comply with
HOMELINE reporting procedures outlined in
ANGR 55-03 and ANGR 127-4.

d. U.S. Department of State is
responsible for dealing with terrorism
involving Americans abroad. The U.S.
response is subject to limitations,
guidelines, and established procedures
set forth in any agreement with the host
nation concerning such matters.

e. FBI responsibilities:

(1) The Federal response to
terrorism acts in the U.S. is the respon-
sibility of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) which coordinates all aspects of
domestic terrorism. Within the DOJ, the
FBI is responsible for the operational
response.

(2) The FBI has primary juris-
diction for domestic terrorism and
assumes jurisdiction if the incident is
of significant Federal interest. ANG
units will first contact the supporting
AFOSI detachment.

f. Local authorities. Terrorist in-
cidents not handled by the FBI within the
US, will revert to the jurisdiction of
local law enforcement agencies.

g. Federal property. Installation
commander is responsible for maintaining
law and order on the installation, which
is recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.
If a terrorist incident occurs on a mili-
tary installation, the installation com-
mander will immediately use his or her
law enforcement assets and supporting
elements, such as military/security po-
lice, CID or OSI, to attempt to restore
law and order. The commander will also
notify the nearest FBI field office im-
mediately so the FBI can exercise their
option to assume jurisdiction if they so
desire. If the FBI decides the incident
is not of significant Federal interest,

the military will take action to resolve
the incident. Under either circumstance,
the installation commander will take
immediate action to prevent loss of life
and/or reduce property damage before the
FBI response force arrives.

1-4. Definitions

a. Active preventive programs
(against terrorism). Those deliberate
low-visibility, clandestine, and/or
covert actions that are taken to deter or
lessen the effectiveness of planned or
actual acts of terrorism. This program
may include political, social, economic,
psychological, military, or a combination
of those actions.

b. Antiterrorism. Defensive meas-
ures taken to reduce the vulnerability of
personnel, their dependents, facilities,
and equipment to terrorist acts.

c. Counter terrorism. Offensive
measures taken to respond to a terrorist
act, including the gathering of informa-
tion and threat analysis in support of
these measures.

d. Crisis management team (CMT). A
team at a major command or installation
level. A CMT is concerned with plans,
procedures, techniques, policies, and
controls for dealing with terrorism,
special threats, or other major disrup-
tions occurring on Government installa-
tions and facilities. A CMT considers
all aspects of the incident and estab-
lishes contact with higher headquarters.

e. High-risk personnel. Personnel
that by their grade, assignment, symbolic
value, or relative isolation are more
likely to be attractive or accessible
terrorist targets.

f. Information security. The result
of any system of administrative policies
and procedures for identifying, controll-
ing, and protecting from unauthorized
disclosure, information of which protec-
tion is authorized by executive order or
statute.

g. Installation. A fixed location
with its land, building, structures,
utilities, and improvements.

h. International terrorists. Those controlled by, and whose actions represent, the national interest of a sovereign state.

i. Those who operate and aspire to political power primarily within a single nation.

j. Security manager/information security program manager. A person designated to administer an effective information security program to include security education and training, assignment of proper classification, downgrading and declassification, safeguarding, and monitorship.

k. State - sponsored terrorism. The deliberate employment of violence or threatened use of violence by sovereign states (or sub-national groups encouraged or assisted by sovereign states) to attain strategic and political objectives by act in violation of law, intended to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or

military victims attached or threatened.

l. Terrorism. The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals, political, religious, or ideological in nature; which is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear. Terrorism involves a criminal act that is symbolic and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims.

m. Terrorism counteraction (TC). An action taken to counter the terrorist threat, including antiterrorism and counter terrorism measures.

n. Terrorist group. A politically, religiously, or ideologically oriented group that uses terrorism as its prime mode of operation.

o. Transnational terrorist. Those terrorist who operate across national borders, and whose actions and political aspirations may affect individuals of more than one nation.



Chapter 2 Threat Assessment

2-1. General

The threat assessment is the point of departure for the development of the antiterrorism program. It is a continuous function for all commanders to use as a basis for identifying high priority locations. As you are addressing the needs identified by your current assessment, other areas may become more vulnerable. Threat assessments must be updated on a regular basis. Failure to correct or compensate for the vulnerabilities identified, restricts your antiterrorism capabilities. As the situation changes, the threat assessment developed by the States will determine current vulnerabilities. The listings of high priority ARNG facilities that have been determined to be high risk areas should be provided to NGB-MS for evaluation. ANG units comply with guidance contained in ANGR 208-1 when determining installation vulnerability.

2-2. Threat analysis

Chapter 4 of TC 19-16 provides guidance

for threat analysis and identified means for determining installation vulnerability.

2-3. Point system

Annex E of TC 19-16, outlines a point system for determining installation vulnerability which lends itself well to the National Guard environment.

2-4. Determining vulnerability/risk

In the case of a unit or installation, the commander is responsible for determining vulnerability/risk, announcing an appropriate terrorist threat condition (THREATCON), and then coordinating the condition with the next higher headquarters and local authorities. The vulnerability assessment/risk analysis must be conducted at a minimum, annually. High risk areas will be identified and reported through the chain of command to the State headquarters, and ultimately to the National Guard Bureau, Attn: NGB-MS, for use in allocating existing resources. The criminal threat, although a main ingredient in the overall threat analysis, should not be confused with the terrorist threat.

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Chapter 3 Security

3-1. Personnel security

Terrorism has become a problem of increasing concern to the world community. The number of terrorist acts has risen sharply and is not at a relatively high level of violence; however, they are subject to frequent reversals of low incidence and intensity. No person is immune from the threat of terrorism. All personnel and their families must understand the threat, the protection plan, their role in that plan, and what to do in an emergency. DA Pamphlet 190-52-1, and appendix G, TC.19-16, outline precautions against terrorism and hostage survival. ANG units and activities are governed by DOD 5200.1R, DOD 5200.2R, and AFR 205-1.

a. Foreign travel briefings. All travel to a foreign country (OCONUS) should be coordinated with your security manager. The security manager should be given enough time to administer the required antiterrorism briefings. The briefings should contain at least current terrorist threat information for that country and self-protection measures. The following may be used to assist with the briefings:

(1) Department of the Army travel security policy to high threat areas (see appendix A).

(2) Monthly international terrorist summary (MITS) (classified). Adjutants general are on automatic distribution.

(3) Unclassified version. Terrorism: The Worldwide Threat and Protective Measures for the U.S. Military (Script and slides provided each Adjutant General)

b. Itineraries. Current policy is to mark all general officer/civilian equivalent itineraries "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)" and limit distribution IAW operational necessity. As an exception, when traveling to areas in threat condition "Delta", (see appendix A), composite itineraries (those that contain overall details of the schedule, arrival/depar-

ture times, and places) for general officer/civilian equivalents will be classified CONFIDENTIAL to ensure the traveler's personal safety. Itineraries are automatically declassified upon completion of travel.

3-2. Physical security

The ongoing physical security program as referenced in NGR 190-11 and AR 190-51 serves as a basis for the protection of Federal property. Under the antiterrorism program, physical security should be expanded to include the perimeter of the facilities (e.g., fencing, lighting, perimeter sensors, and CCTV). After the threat assessment has been conducted, a determination must be made as to what security improvements are required to meet the current threat. Upgrade proposals should be submitted to NGB-MS for evaluation.

3-3. Information security

Classified information relating to national security shall be protected against unauthorized disclosure. All personnel must be continually aware of possible threats from (all-source intelligence efforts) of potential adversaries.

a. Mail classified material through approved channels ahead of scheduled travel. Avoid handcarrying classified material if possible.

b. Do not take classified material home.

c. Security awareness training should be made available to all personnel.

3-4. Automation security

Mainframe computers, personal computers, and mini-computers should be protected IAW AR 380-380 for classified and all levels of sensitive defense data.

3-5. Communications security (COMSEC)

Protective measures will be taken to deny unauthorized persons information delivered from telecommunications of U.S. Government-related to national security

and to ensure the authenticity of such communications.

a. Plans shall be developed for the protection, removal, or destruction of classified material in case of terrorist activity or enemy action.

b. Such plans shall establish detailed procedures and responsibilities for the protection of classified material to ensure that material does not come

into the possession of unauthorized persons.

c. These emergency planning procedures do not apply to material related to COMSEC. Planning for emergency protection including destruction under non-notice conditions of classified COMSEC material shall be developed IAW the requirements in NSA KAG I-D, AR 380-40, and TB 380-41.

Chapter 4 Training

4-1. General

a. This chapter is applicable to the ARNG only; ANG units/activities comply with AFR/ANGR 208-1.

b. The importance of training as a deterrent to counter the terrorist threat cannot be overestimated, as our experiences in Beirut and Lebanon have shown. All personnel must receive terrorist threat awareness training, and unit personnel must learn to recognize why a terrorist threat to their unit may exist throughout the periods of predeployment, deployment, employment, and redeployment. They must recognize appropriate measures to be practiced during all phases to reduce the vulnerability of their unit to a terrorist attack. Defense against terrorism must become routine during training and combat operations. Training available to accomplish these objectives is outlined in appendix B. Units should take advantage of available training resources/opportunities.

4-2. CONUS/OCONUS training

a. All guard units deploying

CONUS/OCONUS for training will develop an increased awareness of the terrorist threat.

b. To increase threat awareness, all operations plans and orders, whether exercises/training contingency operations or combat, will include an assessment of the actual terrorist threat (or absence of threat) in the "enemy forces" subparagraph. The subparagraph for "coordinating instructions" will contain instructions, if required, for defensive measures to be taken against the threat and reporting procedures in the event of actual attack or other pertinent terrorist activities.

c. If a unit is to be operating in a threat area, the unit movement directives will contain instruction directing a pre-deployment orientation concerning the terrorist threat.

d. Threat briefings and assessments must be provided at home station prior to deployment OCONUS.

e. Units/organizations/individuals preparing for OCONUS training/exercises should request assistance from their servicing readiness group or CONUSA in arranging for the required threat briefings and assessment information. See appendix D.



Chapter 5 Intelligence

5-1. General

a. This chapter is applicable to the ARNG only; ANG units/activities comply with AFR/ANGR 208-1.

b. Timely and accurate intelligence serves as the most important elements in dealing with the threat of terrorism. Various intelligence sources are available to the National Guard for this purpose.

5-2. DA source

Each adjutant general is on distribution to receive DA's Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center's (ITAC) monthly international terrorist summary (MITS), and is an addressee on the DA terrorist threat alert net. The MITS provides threat data to the MACOMS on a monthly basis. The DA terrorist threat alert net provides specific warnings (THREATCONS) of terrorist threats to DOD elements when they are identified.

5-3. Other sources

For additional assistance, it is recommended that contact be established with local police and State or Federal agencies (FBI, USACIDC, DAMI-CIC, etc.). For the latest threat information affecting the ARNG contact 902d MI Group (local 902d MI group field office). A list of field offices is in appendix G.

5-4. Collection activities

U.S. Army Intelligence collection activities are guided by AR 381-10.

5-5. Intelligence update

To ensure the currency of terrorism intelligence information, it is essential that continuous dialogue with the FBI, MI agents, and other law enforcement officials be maintained to enable earliest possible warning of threat situation. Liaison with local law enforcement authorities is especially recommended.

5-6. Area specific threat briefing

Personnel traveling through or to terrorist-threatened areas must be provided an area-specific threat briefing, to include antiterrorism measures. Normally, the ITAC "Terrorism the worldwide threat and protective measures for U.S. Military" TC 19-16, supplemented by current data in the ITAC MITS will be used. The wartime and peacetime applicability of the code of conduct will be included.

5-7. Terrorist threat conditions (THREATCONS)

The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command provides information to Army Commanders on terrorist threat conditions concerning personnel, facilities, and operations. THREATCONS are declared in accordance with the information in appendix A.

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Chapter 6 Bomb Threats

6-1. General

a. This chapter is applicable to the ARNG only/ ANG units/activities comply with AFR/ANGR 125-37.

b. Sixty-seven percent of all terrorist incidents recorded during the last decade were attributed to bombs. The methods of getting a bomb to a target include--

- (1) Vehicle bombs - body-trapped vehicles, attached devices, and car bombs (cars filled with explosives).
- (2) Laid charges - bombs placed by hand.
- (3) Projected bombs - bombs thrown by hand or projected by a motor device.
- (4) Postal bombs - enclosed in letter mail or package.

6-2. Bomb threats and incidents

a. The most common method of receiving a bomb threat is by telephone. Therefore, an accurate analysis of the call can provide many clues on which to base actions, investigations, and decisions. A person who is properly prepared will remain calm and take full advantage of the situation to improve the likelihood that the incident will be safely and effectively handled. It is important to develop a bomb threat plan for each National Guard facility. See SAMPLE Plan at appendix E.

b. All telephone operators or receptionists (as well as other office personnel) should be trained to respond calmly to a bomb threat or call. Since a telephone bomb threat could be directed to any extension, it is advisable to have a checklist at each phone (see appendix E). A copy of a bomb threat report should be the first page in the activity's telephone book and everyone should be aware of it.

c. Bomb threat incident planning should provide for the receipt of the threat or warning, rapid and orderly evacuation, the search and discovery of a suspected bomb, the employment of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel to

deactivate or dispose of the bomb, and an all clear order for personnel to reenter facility.

d. Once a bomb threat is received the decision must be made to--

- (1) Identify the first person to be notified.
- (2) Neither search nor evacuate.
- (3) Search without reaction.
- (4) Evacuate and search.

6-3. Search operations

Personnel operating in offices, storage areas, maintenance facilities, airfields, etc., should be responsible for searching their own work spaces. The special team search is the safest and most time consuming. For whatever search system is employed, however, personnel should have some training in systematic search procedures and bomb recognition. Their training should emphasize that they are searchers and not EOD personnel. The only personnel who should touch or move suspicious objects are trained EOD personnel.

6-4. Explosive ordnance disposal support

To properly respond to an actual bomb threat, it is necessary to be able to request EOD assistance promptly knowing that time is of the essence. Every effort should be made early to identify--

- a. What organization will provide EOD or search dog support when required.
- b. How much time will it take for EOD assistance to arrive at your location once notified.

6-5. Sources of EOD support

- a. Police Department (most large cities).
- b. Army/Air Force/Navy EOD units. See list of U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force EOD units (appendix F).

6-6. Responsibility

The National Guard commander of a facility or the senior National Guard official present, will take charge during a bomb threat situation. State Guard headquarters and NGB-MS will be promptly notified of the situation.

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Chapter 7 Briefings

7-1. General

Defense security briefing to all U.S. Government employees traveling to communist-controlled countries, regardless of position or assignment, are likely to be of interest to intelligence services. Hostile intelligence networks make it their business to learn the identities of Americans, and frequently attempt to target them for intelligence approaches when they travel abroad. The approach may be direct, indirect, highly sophisticated, or crudely obvious. In any case, U.S. personnel traveling to Communist-controlled countries should be constantly alert to the problems that can befall them. The defense security briefing provided U.S. Government employees traveling to communist-controlled countries will

make employees aware of the pitfalls associated with such travel and advise them on defensive measures against intelligence exploitations. (appendix K, AR 604-5 and AFR 205-1).

7-2. Various briefings

a. Briefing requirements are outlined in appendix D and in AFR/ANGR 205-1 for ANG units and personnel.

b. To increase threat awareness, the following briefings will be conducted:

(1) General awareness threat briefings for all personnel.

(2) Briefing of personnel/units organization preparing for OCONUS training/exercises.

(3) Briefing of personnel traveling through or to terrorist threatened areas.

(4) Semiannual update briefing for commanders.



Chapter 8
Public Affairs

8-1. Information protection

Information on specific measures taken to reduce personal vulnerability to terrorist acts should be protected as "FOUO". Such protected information should not be released to civilian news media, and care should be used in publication of such information in command information products.

8-2. Release guidance

If asked about antiterrorism measures,

National Guard spokespersons should restrict their comments to general measures taken and the obvious, visible physical security measures such as barricades or increased security force. Before information is released to the public, the public affairs officer must coordinate the release with all law enforcement agencies involved in a terrorist incident.

8-3. Further guidance

Questions beyond the scope of the above guidance should be referred through channels to NGB-PA, AUTOVON 225-0421.



Chapter 9

Installation Vulnerability Determining System

9-1. General

This chapter is applicable to the ARNG only; ANG units and activities will comply with AFR/ANGR 208-1. The purpose of the Installation Vulnerability Determining System (IVDS) is to provide a comparative measuring device to assess the vulnerability of your installation.

9-2. Description

A measurement system has been developed that, combined with crime prevention, physical security surveys and terrorist threat intelligence can provide the installation commander with an accurate vulnerability assessment. This is the INVDS in appendix E, Training Circular TC 19-16. It provides an analytical tool for identifying vulnerable areas, establishing training priorities, and allocating resources to counter, or react to, a terrorist threat.



APPENDIX A
Terrorist Threat Conditions (THREATCONS)

A-1. General

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with full concurrence of the services, have approved four Terrorist Threat Conditions (THREATCONS). These are intended to facilitate inter-service coordination and support for US Military anti-terrorism activities throughout the Department of Defense.

b. THE FOUR THREATCONS (above normal) are defined as follows:

(1) THREATCON ALPHA. This condition applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against installations and personnel, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and when the circumstances do not justify full implementation of the measures of THREATCON BRAVO. However, it may be necessary to implement certain selected measures from higher THREATCONS as a result of intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

(2) THREATCON BRAVO. This condition applied when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities.

(3) THREATCON CHARLIE. This condition applies when an incident occurs or when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against installations and personnel is imminent. Implementation of this measure for more than a short period will probably create hardship and will affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

(4) THREATCON DELTA. This condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. This THREATCON is normally issued as a localized warning.

A-2. THREATCON Responsibility

Declaration of THREATCONS and implementation of measures may be decreed by a US Command or Agency or by local commander or head of an agency following receipt of intelligence through official sources or following an anonymous threat. Lateral as well as vertical reporting is directed to ensure dissemination of THREATCON to potentially affected areas.

A-3. Uniform Implementation

Guidance for Uniform Implementation of Security Alert Conditions is based upon the following assessment factors:

a. EXISTENCE. Applies when a terrorist group is present in an area of concern. Group need not have posed a threat to US or DoD interests in the past.

b. CAPABILITY. Applies when a terrorist group has the ability to carry out an operation against US interests in areas of concern. This includes resources such as intelligence, mobility, personnel, and equipment (I.E., explosives, arms and ammunition).

d. TRENDS. Applies if the group has, over the past year, displayed significant terrorist activity that appears to be continuing or increasing. Activity need not have been violent; I.E., terrorist attack against US or DoD interests could be rhetorical or threatening utterances or statements. This factor could be flexible if it is apparent that the group's activity cycle is longer, or shorter, than 1 year.

e. TARGETING. Applies if there are known plans or confirmed intentions of a terrorist group to target US or DoD interests. If targeting is not against US or DoD interests, this factor should not be considered.

A-4. Threat Level

Combination of positive answers to questions of applicability of any or all of the above assessment factors, as defined, will produce a threat level of either low, medium, high, or imminent.

a. LOW (THREATCON ALPHA). Factors of existence and capability must be present.

b. MEDIUM (THREATCON BRAVO). Factors of existence and capability must be present; history or trends should also be present. Current targeting of US or DoD interests will not be present.

c. HIGH (THREATCON CHARLIE). Factors of existence, capability, trends, and US or DoD targeting (not immediate, nonspecific) must be present. History may also be present.

d. IMMINENT (THREATCON DELTA). Factors of group existence capability, immediate/specific targeting of US or DoD interests, and trends must be present. History is not required but could be present. (assessment of "imminent" is rare). NOTE: These guidelines apply only to the assessment or terrorist threat against US or DoD interests.

A-5. Reporting Procedures. ARNG units see Appendix I; ANG units and activities comply with the provisions of AFR/ANGR 208-1.

A-6. Threat Condition and Measures.

Threat Conditions and measures are outlined in succeeding pages.

THREATCON ALPHA

A-7. THREATCON ALPHA

This condition is declared as a general warning of possible terrorist activity, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, when the circumstances do not justify full implementation of the measures contained in a higher THREATCON. However, it may be necessary to implement selected "Measures from higher THREATCONS.

a. MEASURE 1. At regular intervals, remind all personnel, including dependents, to be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers; alert for unidentified vehicles on, or in the vicinity of US installations; and alert for abandoned parcels or suitcases or both.

b. MEASURE 2. Keep available at all times the duty officer or other appointed personnel who have access to plans for evacuating buildings and areas in use and for sealing off any areas where an explosion or attack has occurred. Keep on call key personnel who may be needed to implement security plans.

c. MEASURE 3. Secure buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

d. MEASURE 4. Increase security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering the installations and nonclassified areas under the jurisdiction of the US Command and Agency.

e. MEASURE 5. Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic

f. MEASURE 6. As a deterrent, apply one of the following measures from the THREATCON BRAVO individually and randomly.

(1) Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms and storage areas not in regular use. (measure 14)

(2) At the beginning and end of each workday and at other regular and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious activity or packages. (measure 15)

(3) Check all deliveries to messes, clubs, etc. (advise dependents to check all home deliveries.) (measure 17)

(4) As far as resources allow, increase surveillance of domestic accommodations, schools, messes, clubs, and other soft targets to improve deterrence and defense and to build confidence among staff and dependents. (measure 18)

g. MEASURE 7. Review all plans, orders, personnel details, and logistic requirements related to the introduction of the higher THREATCON.

h. MEASURE 8. Review and implement, as appropriate, security measures for high-risk personnel.

i. SPARE.

THREATCON BRAVO

A-8. THREATCON BRAVO

This condition is declared when there is an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity even though no particular target has been identified.

a. MEASURE 10. Repeat measure 1 and warn personnel of any other form of attack to be used by terrorists.

b. MEASURE 11. Keep all personnel involved in implementing anti-terrorist contingency plans on call.

c. MEASURE 12. Check plans for implementation of the measures contained in the next THREATCON.

d. MEASURE 13. Where possible, cars and such objects as crates, trash containers, etc., are to be moved at least 25 meters from buildings, particularly those buildings of a sensitive or prestigious nature. Consider the application of centralized parking.

e. MEASURE 14. Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

f. MEASURE 15. At the beginning and end of each workday and at other regular and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious packages.

g. MEASURE 16. Examine all mail for letter or parcel bombs. (This examination is increased above normal.)

h. MEASURE 17. Check all deliveries to messes, clubs, etc. (Advise dependents to check all home deliveries.)

i. MEASURE 18. As far as resources allow, increase surveillance of domestic accommodations, schools, messes, clubs, and other soft targets to improve deterrence and defense and to build confidence among staff and dependents.

j. MEASURE 19. Make staff and dependents aware of the general situation in order to stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm.

k. MEASURE 20. At an early stage, inform members of local security committees of any action being taken and why.

l. MEASURE 21. Upon entry of visitors to the unit, physically inspect them and a percentage of their suitcases, parcels, and other containers.

m. MEASURE 22. Wherever possible, operate random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.

n. MEASURE 23. Protect off-base military personnel and military transport in accordance with prepared plans. Remind drivers to lock parked vehicles and to institute a positive system of checking before they enter and drive a car.

o. MEASURE 24. Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel, as appropriate.

p. MEASURE 25. Brief personnel who may augment guard force on use of deadly force.

q. MEASURE 26-29. Spare.

THREATCON CHARLIE

A-9. THREATCON CHARLIE

This condition is declared when an incident occurs or when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action is imminent.

- a. MEASURE 30. Continue all THREATCON BRAVO measures or introduce those outstanding.
- b. MEASURE 31. Keep available at their places of duty all personnel who are responsible for implementing anti-terrorist plans.
- c. MEASURE 32. Limit access points to absolute minimum.
- d. MEASURE 33. Strictly enforce control of entry and search a percentage of vehicles.
- e. MEASURE 34. Enforce centralized parking of vehicles away from sensitive buildings.
- f. MEASURE 35. Issue weapons to guards. (Local orders should include specific orders on issue of ammunition.)
- g. MEASURE 36. Introduce increased patrolling of the installation.
- h. MEASURE 37. Protect all designated vulnerable points (VPS) and give special attention to VPS outside military establishments.
- i. MEASURE 38. Erect barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow.
- j. MEASURE 39. Spare.

THREATCON DELTA

A-10. THREATCON DELTA

This condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, this THREATCON is declared as a localized warning.

- a. MEASURE 40. Continue or introduce all measures listed for THREATCONS BRAVO and CHARLIE.
- b. MEASURE 41. Augment guards as necessary.
- c. MEASURE 42. Identify all vehicles already on the installation within operational or mission support areas.
- d. MEASURE 43. Search all vehicles entering the complex or installation as well as vehicles' contents.
- e. MEASURE 44. Control all access and implement positive identification of all personnel.
- f. MEASURE 45. Search all suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., brought into the complex or installation.
- g. MEASURE 46. Take measures to control access to all areas under the jurisdiction of the US command or agency concerned.
- h. MEASURE 47. Make frequent checks of the exterior of buildings and of parking areas.
- i. MEASURE 48. Minimize all administrative journeys and visits.
- j. MEASURE 49. Consult local authorities about closing public (and military) roads and facilities that might make sites more vulnerable to terrorist attack.
- k. MEASURE 50. Spare.



APPENDIX B
Anti-terrorism Travel Policy

B-1. General Policy

To establish administrative procedures to improve the personal security of all soldiers, family members, and DA civilians traveling through, or to, a terrorist threatened area.

- a. Limit TDY to, or through, terrorist threatened areas to mission essential only.
- b. If feasible, authorize reimbursement for the purchase of a regular fee (Blue) passport if the area traveled to, or through, is identified as a high threat area.
- c. Use US facilities for billeting and other requirements when hosting meetings, conferences, or seminars.
- d. Discourage unofficial travel to terrorist threatened areas.

B-2. Application

These policies are intended to use existing systems and procedures, e.g., SAEDA briefings, with additional attention focused on individual travelers in a TDY, PCS or leave status. MACOMS, FOA and the AR staff will implement the following security measures, which are intended to lower the symbolic profile of travelers and increase the individual's chances of surviving a terrorist incident:

- a. Require authorization for civilian clothing to be stated on orders.
- b. Eliminate reference to rank and military organization (titles) when possible. Use UIC or office symbols on government issued orders and tickets.
- c. Use military airlift or scheduled military airlift command (MAC) flights when possible.
- d. Itineraries should be made without reference to rank.
- e. Discourage carrying classified material.
- f. Authorization to use foreign flag airlines and/or indirect routing to avoid threatened airports.

(NOTE: Travelers must disembark at the nearest interchange from point of origin and continue the journey on American flag carriers.)

B-3. Personal Security: Military/Civilian

- a. Avoid unofficial travel to terrorist threatened areas.
- b. Use military aircraft or MAC when possible.
- c. Avoid wearing of military uniforms on commercial aircraft traveling through, or to, a terrorist threatened airport.
- d. Wear nondescript civilian clothing on commercial flights.
- e. Obtain written authorization on travel orders to wear civilian clothing when traveling on military aircraft connecting with commercial flight which will transit terrorist threatened areas.
- f. All references to military rank should be eliminated from itineraries, baggage, IDs, etc.
- g. OCONUS overnight lodging should be in BOQ/BEQ or other U.S. approved facilities.
- h. Limit number of documents in possession which confirm affiliation with DOD--place in checked baggage.
- i. Avoid loitering in public section of airport.
- j. Avoid discussing your military association with anyone.
- k. Blend with other passengers.

B-4. Passports

- a. Blanket approval and reimbursement for the use of regular (Blue) passports is not authorized.
- b. A no-fee official (Red) passport and/or official orders with military ID card will be used if required by country being visited.
- c. Family members will continue to use the no-fee regular (Blue) passport.
- d. When applicable reimbursement will be made for regular-fee (Blue) passports when traveling on official orders to/from terrorist threatened areas by commercial air.
- e. Surrender tourist (Blue) passports in response to a general demand for identification.
- f. Only confirm DA affiliation when directly confronted by terrorists and that travel under personal passport is normal and no deceit is intended.

B-5. Training Requirements

- a. Commanders will emphasize the following as part of annual training (OCONUS exercise/actual operations).
 - (1) SAEDA briefings.
 - (2) Terrorism threat awareness briefings (IAW AR 190-52).
- b. Force protection guidance briefings.
- c. Code of Conduct and its wartime and peacetime applicability.

B-6. Release of Information

- a. Information on specific measures taken to reduce personal vulnerability to terrorist acts should be protected as "FOUO".
- b. Information should not be released to civilian news media.

B-7. Hand Carrying of Classified Documents

- a. Discourage handcarrying classified documents.
- b. Transmit via approved channels ahead of scheduled travel.
- c. Strongly reinforce restrictions (Para 8-301, AR 380-5, and information concerning carrying SCI information.)

B-8. High Risk Areas

Information on high risk areas will be disseminated to the services by the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for international security affairs on a close hold basis.

APPENDIX C
Anti-Terrorism Training

C-1. General

The training courses and training materials outlined in this appendix are available to ARNG units and personnel through normal military education and training aids support channels. ANG units and activities should attempt to acquire quotas to those desired courses in coordination with ANGSC/TET. ANG units are encouraged to inquire as to the possibility of establishing accounts at regional Army Training Aids Support Centers (TASC).

C-2. Courses which are available to the Army National Guard that support the Army Terrorism Counter Action policy include:

a. Terrorism counteraction instructor training course - 1 week - TBD/CGSC. CGSC course provides instructors from Army and other schools with the requisite knowledge to enable them to teach terrorism counteraction. Subject matter includes terrorism as a sociopolitical phenomenon, terrorist organization and operational techniques, and the Army's concept for terrorism counteraction.

b. Countering terrorism on military installations - 1 week - USAMPS. Target population is selected installation staff officers and NCO's. Course includes the use of intelligence to counter terrorism, the nature of the terrorist threat, physical security planning, operations security, personal security, hostage negotiations, legal aspects of terrorism, crisis management and planning/implementation.

c. Special Reaction Team (SRT) training - 2 weeks - USAMPS. Course is to train installation SRT's tactics and specialized police operations. Subject matter includes hostage situation psychology/negotiation, instinctive firearms training, intelligence reporting, and incident preplanning.

d. Evasive driving for general officer drivers and protective service personnel - 3 days - USAMPS - Bill Scott Raceway, Summitt Point, West Virginia. Course is to train general officer drivers, who have been assigned to overseas positions, in basic vehicle handling techniques, skid control, and normal speed.

e. General officer evasive driving course - 1.5 days - USAMPS - Bill Scott Raceway, Summitt Point, West Virginia. Course provides general officers and spouses (space available), who have been assigned to overseas positions, with an overview of threat tactics and hands-on anti-terrorism driving techniques.

f. Senior officer terrorism counteraction seminar - 2 days - USAMPS. Target population is installation chief of staff and deputy installation commanders. The purpose of the course is to increase both terrorism awareness and command support for terrorism counter-action programs at the installation level. Course includes the terrorist threat, legal aspects, vulnerability assessment and self-protection measures (not available in FY 87).

g. Intelligence in terrorism counteraction - 2 weeks - USAAICS. The course is designed to provide qualified tactical analysis skills and knowledge to support terrorism counteraction operations conducted by the US Army and Joint Operations. It includes terrorist threats, organizations, ideologies, tactics, modus operandi, trends, targets and counteraction intelligence operations.

h. Hostage negotiation course - 2 weeks - USAMPS - first course October 86. Course will train selected installation and USACIDC personnel in proper procedures to be used in hostage situations. Subject matter includes hostage situations, principles and tactics, terrorism counteraction focusing on personal type identification and characteristics and the collection of intelligence data concerning both personnel and environment.

i. Protective service detail - 3.5 weeks - USAMPS - first course October 86. Course will train selected personnel in providing the full spectrum of personal protection. It includes protective services tactics, anti-ambush operations, evasive driving, attacks on principals, counter-surveillance operations and self-applied personal security measures.

j. Individual terrorism awareness course - 1 week - USAJFKSWC. The course provides a basic understanding of the principles of terrorism and terrorism counteraction at national or regional levels in a low intensity conflict environment. Emphasis is to provide personnel with sufficient background in terrorism to assist them in planning, organizing, and employing national level assets in their area of responsibility.

k. Terrorism in a low intensity conflict - 1 week - USAJFKSWC. The course provides a basic understanding of the principles of terrorism and terrorism counteraction at national or regional levels in low intensity conflict environments. Emphasis is to provide personnel with sufficient background in terrorism to assist them in planning, organizing, and employing national level assets in their area of responsibility.

l. Anti-Terrorism instructor qualification course - 2 weeks - USAJFKSWC. Course teaches selected personnel to present anti-terrorism instruction to individuals and units deploying OCONUS in order to minimize their vulnerability to a terrorist attack. Subject taught includes an introduction to terrorism, terrorist organizations and operations, individual protective measures, hostage survival techniques, how to present a threat briefing, resistance to interrogation, and hostage communication techniques.

C-3. In addition to formal resident courses, TRADOC has limited Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) available to support mission requirements. Early projection and coordination of requirements with TRADOC will enhance TRADOC's ability to support training requests. TRADOC's terrorism counteractions officer at Ft. Leavenworth is a "ONE STEP" clearing house for requests for MTT's and questions related to terrorism counteraction doctrine and training. The message address is COMDT, USACGSC, FT Leavenworth, KS, ATZL-SWJ-CA. Telephone numbers are - autovon: 552-2131; commercial: (913) 684-2131.

C-4. The above courses are listed in the Army formal schools catalog (DA PAM 351-4). Army quotas are controlled by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Training, US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Quotas are suballocated by TRADOC: Army National Guard Bureau, NGB-ARO-ME Autovon: 584-4789; requests for attendance should be processed through unit training personnel, using NGB Form 64.

C-5. In addition to the above training courses, terrorism counteraction (TC/A) training for reserve component (RC) personnel poses a problem for the Army training community. The problem centers on the fact that resident training can not provide a sufficient number of TC/A qualified personnel to train RC forces in an acceptable time period. This problem was recognized at

the Sep 84 TC/A functional area assessment. One possible solution which is being considered is teletraining. The concept calls for a training session to be conducted over a weekend (Approximately 6 hours each day for a total of 12 training hours). The instruction would be conducted at a central location and televised via satellite to approximately 20 locations where selected personnel would be assembled.

C-6. California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI). This institution provides an excellent training course in terrorism awareness. Information about the course and course schedules may be obtained from the California Specialized Training Institute, Camp San Luis Obispo CA 93406, telephone (805) 544-7101. CSTI is open to all Army National Guard, each state obtains there own quotas through the Commanding General, State Military Forces, CAARNG, Attention J-3, Army. States will utilize existing BP-3130 funds.

C-7. Terrorism films and tapes available for Active, Army Reserve, and National Guard can supplement/complement resident courses and MTT's. The following TC related films/TV tapes are a commercial package and portrays non military personnel. Trainers should review the films for appropriateness of target audience prior to showing. This package is available thru Training and Audio Visual Aids Support Center.

| | |
|------------|--|
| AFIF 320 | A Lesson in Terrorism - Nov 79 |
| TF 19-6080 | Management of Special Threat Situations - Oct 78 |
| TVT 19-69 | Self Protection Measures Against Terrorism - Feb 84 |
| TVT 19-7 | High Risk Patrol Tactics: (3/4" TVT 34 Min) |
| TVT 19-30 | Bombs I: 20 Min |
| TVT 19-31 | Bombs II: 20 Min |
| TVT 19-32 | Bombs III: 20 Min |
| AFIF 319 | Postmark Terror: 15 Min |
| TVT 19-34 | Ambush: Tool of Terror: 11 Min |
| TVT 19-35 | Vehicle Under Attack: 15 Min |
| TVT 19-36 | Your Money or Your Life: 16 Min |
| AVK 20-11 | Surviving Hostage Situations: 27 Min |
| TVT 19-37 | Patrol Vehicle Operations, Part II Emergency Driving 11 Min |
| TVT 19-38 | Shotgun: Second Weapon: 26 Min |
| AVK 19-8 | Survival Shooting Techniques: 35 Min |
| TVT 19-39 | Defensive Tactics No. 3 Survival Tactics: 2 Min |
| TVT 3-5 | Use of Chemical Agents: 23 Min |
| TVT 19-40 | Public Official Protection - Basic Movement Techniques 18 Min |
| TVT 19-42 | Officer Survival: Barricaded Suspect-Color - 7 Min |
| TVT 19-44 | Officer Survival: Felony Stop-Color - 11 Min |
| TVT 19-45 | Officer Survival: Armed Suspect-Color - 7 Min |
| TVT 19-46 | Officer Survival: Shooting-Color - 19 Min |
| TVT 19-74 | Protective Services: The Human Factor Color - 19 Min |
| TVT 20-589 | Time of the Jackals-Color - 50 Min |
| TASC 19-33 | Planning for Bomb Threats: (35mm Slides with Binder) |

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APPENDIX D
ANTI-TERRORIST THREAT BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS - CONUS/OCONUS

| BRIEFING FOR | CONTENT | REFERENCE | SOURCE | RESPONSIBILITY |
|--|---|---|---|--|
| 1. Staff/Assigned Military and Civilian Personnel. | Threat awareness briefing | a. *Terrorism: The world-wide Threat and Protective Measures for the U.S. Military (Script and 35 mm slides) b. Training video tape TWT 19-69 (Self Protection Against Terrorism). | a. U.S. Army Intelligence Analysis Center b. U.S. Army Audio Visual (two copies provided to each state). | Intelligence Off/ Security Manager G-2/S-2 |
| **Negotiations in process with USA ITAC to provide distribution | | | | |
| 2. Units/Individuals preparing for OCONUS training/exercises preparing for OCONUS training exercises | a. Threat Briefing b. Defensive measures information | a. Monthly International Terrorist Summary (MITS), personnel w/o SECRET clearance use item 1a above. b. Field Circular (FC) 100-37-1 (Unit Terrorism Counteraction) | a. ITAC b. C & GSC Ft Leavenworth, KS NOTE: FORSSCOM to make distribution to TAG (All States) | a. Intel Off/ Security Mgr G-2/S-2 b. G-3/S-3 or Ops Officer |
| 3. Personnel traveling through or to terrorist threatened areas. | a. Threat awareness briefing (area specific) b. Defensive measures information | References as shown in item 2 above. | U.S. Army Intelligence Center (ITAC) NOTE: TAG on distribution for MITS. | a. Same as shown in item 2 above. |
| 4. Semi-Annual terrorist threat update for Bn Commanders and above | Threat awareness briefing. | MTS | U.S. Army Intelligence Analysis Center. | Intel Officer Security Manager |

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APPENDIX E

ANG units and activities will be governed by the provisions of ANGR 125-37 in the development of Resource Protection Plans.

S A M P L E

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD BOMB THREAT PLAN

Annex A - Bomb Threat Phone Report.....E-6
Annex B - Caller Identification Check ListE-7
Annex C - Important PointersE-8
Annex D - Preplanning Considerations to the Bomb Threat Plan.....E-9

E-1. SITUATION

a. General. The possibility of terrorist, criminal, and/or actual attempted bombings exist. This plan establishes general procedures designed for (state) National Guard facilities, to prevent or reduce potential injury to personnel and damage to property in the event of an actual explosion. This plan also provides proper guidance in planning for and responding to bomb threats.

b. Enemy Forces. Individuals or organizations with the capability or intention of staging a bomb threat or bombing against the (state) National Guard facilities.

c. Friendly Forces. All National Guard units/activities, and civil authorities located within the (state).

d. Assumptions.

(1) Individuals or groups are capable of staging bomb threats, bomb plants and bombings which will endanger life and damage government property.

(2) Bomb threat notices, discoveries of bombs or explosions may occur in and/or around this facility.

(3) Bomb threats will actually materialize and will be followed by bombings which could cause massive personal injury, deaths, fires and destruction.

(4) There would be little or no forewarning preceding a bombing incident which may occur during either duty or nonduty hours.

E-2. MISSION. To provide reactive measures for application against bomb threats, bomb plants, or bombings; to provide an effective means for orderly evacuation and search of building or area; to prevent damage to buildings and equipment; and to provide a means whereby essential personnel and services may be requested to effectively cope with a bomb threat, bomb plant or bombing.

E-3. EXECUTION

a. General.

(1) Rapid and orderly evacuation and subsequent search of the building or area suspected to contain a bomb is of paramount importance. Individual tasks and responsibilities that apply in the execution of this plan are described and set forth in the three separate phases listed in paragraphs 3b thru 3d below.

(2) Phase I explains what to do upon receipt of a bomb threat message.

Phase II deals with discovery of a bomb and the reactive measures that must be applied. Phase III pertains to an explosion and those measures that will be taken to counteract its effects.

(3) Under no circumstances will firemen, rescue workers, medical personnel, military police and explosive ordnance personnel normally engaged in coping with a bomb threat, bomb plant or bombing be barred or obstructed from entering the facility, unless said structure has been declared off limits for safety reasons; i.e., identified explosive device or structure weakened by explosion.

(4) Search procedures relative to a suspected bomb plant are a unit/activity responsibility and, as such, will be carried out by the senior person present and selected individuals who normally work in the affected area.

(5) It must be left to common sense and proper judgement of the senior person to ensure that all personnel who must evacuate the building are sufficiently clothed and protected from prolonged exposure to the elements.

(6) Preplanning for bomb threats can be done using Annex D as a guide.

b. Phase I - Bomb Threat:

(1) The first person who becomes knowledgeable of a telephonic bomb threat message will record all information received in its entirety and will fill out a Bomb Threat Phone Report, a sample format is contained in Annex A. This information will be furnished to the National Guard commander or senior responsible person present who will turn it in to the police investigators as soon as possible. Written bomb threats will be protected from excessive handling to preserve investigative possibilities such as latent fingerprints. ALL BOMB THREAT NOTICES WILL BE TREATED AS IF AN EXPLOSION WILL RESULT.

(2) The senior responsible person present will:

(a) Ensure all key personnel responsible for each sub-area within the building are informed of the pertinent information concerning the bomb threat. These personnel will ensure that all their subordinates in their area check for suspicious items within their immediate vicinity. The decision to search prior to evacuation is a crucial one and should be evaluated by the National Guard commander/senior person in regards to the situation. However, it should be noted that the personnel who normally work in these areas would be able to immediately identify items that are "out of place."

(b) Once the decision is made to evacuate the building and a safe evacuation route and assembly point is identified, the senior person will detail personnel to alert everyone in the area or building to immediately evacuate and which route to use. This warning will be continued until all personnel have evacuated the area. Group control will be exercised at all times.

(c) Detail a responsible individual to place the following call in the most expeditious manner possible. The sequence listed will be closely followed; however, certain adjustments may be necessary and should any lines be busy, the next number in the list will be called:

- 1 Security Officer
- 2 POMSO
- 3 EOD
- 4 Chief of Staff
- 5 City Police
- 6 State Police

(d) Ensure that classified material is properly secured in safes or vaults before personnel begin evacuation procedures.

(e) Ensure that doors and windows in the affected area are opened if it is possible to do so.

(f) National Guard commander/senior official must decide, depending on the situation, whether to conduct a more thorough search with selected representatives from each sub-area within the building or area, or to reoccupy the building if no suspicious items are found.

(g) National Guard commander/senior official should detail individuals to form a perimeter around affected building/area to prevent entry of unauthorized unsuspecting persons until the arrival of the police.

c. Phase II - Bomb Discovery:

(1) When a bomb or suspicious item is found, personnel should be immediately evacuated to a safe distance from the suspected bomb (a 300-foot radius from the bomb is the suggested safe distance). Evacuation doesn't necessarily mean "out of the building," it could mean out of the danger area. This is important if your only exit is on the other side of the bomb. This would prevent walking past the bomb in order to exit the building. An alternative is to move to the opposite end of the building placing at least two walls between you and the bomb

(2) Just because a suspected bomb has been discovered in one area, no one can be sure that multiple bombs have not been placed in the surrounding area. Therefore, after a suspected bomb has been rendered safe by explosive ordnance personnel, the search (depending on the situation) should be continued until all areas have been cleared.

(3) The first person to discover a bomb or suspicious item will not touch or approach the item. He should notify the senior person present and inform him of the exact location and description of the item and evacuate the immediate area of the item.

(4) The National Guard commander/senior official will:

(a) Depending on the situation, either evacuate all personnel from the building or continue the search until all areas are clear.

(b) Once the decision is made to evacuate, ensure that all personnel evacuate the area in an orderly manner to a safe distance from the suspected danger area. Group control will be exercised at all times.

(c) Detail a responsible individual to place the calls previously listed and explained in paragraph 3b(2) in the most expeditious manner possible.

(d) Ensure that the crime scene is preserved and classified materials are protected, as much as possible, taking into account that protection of life and prevention of injury takes precedence over these matters.

(e) Ensure that only trained teams are allowed to remove, handle or defuse the suspected explosive device.

(f) Ensure that doors and windows in the affected area are opened if it is possible to do so.

(g) Detail individuals to form a perimeter around affected building/ area to prevent entry of unauthorized/unsuspecting person until the arrival of the police.

d. Phase III - Explosions: Immediately following an explosion:

(1) All personnel will shout the warning "EVACUATE IMMEDIATELY." This warning will be continued until all personnel who are physically able to evacuate have done so. Evacuations will be rapid and orderly to a safe distance away from the blast area.

(2) The senior person who is physically capable of taking charge will:

(a) Ensure that basic first aid is administered to all personnel in need of treatment, within the capabilities existing at the time, until doctors and other personnel arrive.

(b) Detail a responsible individual to place the calls previously listed and explained in paragraph 3b(2) in the most expeditious manner possible.

(c) Ensure all personnel who are physically incapable of evacuating are assisted or carried out of the area.

(d) Detail individuals to form a perimeter around the building/area to prevent entry of unauthorized persons until the arrival of the police/EOD personnel.

E-4 Tasks and Responsibilities

- a. National Guard Commander/Senior Official:
 - (1) Ensure that the danger area is cordoned off; control entry/egress within the area; and begin to identify possible suspects/witnesses.
 - (2) Notify medical assistance - Dial 911 in emergency.
 - (3) Ensure that all calls previously listed in paragraph 3b(2) have been made and TAG has been notified.
 - (4) Assist in the control and circulation of personnel involved in investigative and emergency operations within the cordoned area.
 - (5) Upon notification, activate the EOC.
 - (6) Implement this plan.
 - (7) Maintain liaison with principal agencies, as required.
- b. Public Affairs Officer will take photographs of the scene and spectators.

E-5 Coordination

- a. National Guard Commander/Senior Official will:
 - (1) Ensure sufficient copies of the Bomb Threat Plan are available for subordinates and conspicuously posted within areas of responsibility.
 - (2) Ensure that individuals in their unit/activity are aware of the personal responsibility during Phase I; i.e., that "SEARCH" PROCEDURES WILL BE CARRIED OUT BY PERSONNEL WHO WORK IN THE THREATENED AREA.
 - (3) Ensure that evacuation and assembly area information is posted conspicuously on bulletin boards.
- b. Administrative and Logistics:
 - (1) All units will be available for support as required.
 - (2) Plans, Operations and Military Support Officer will submit an after-action report to the Chief of Staff not later than three (3) working days after an incident.

E-6. Command and Signal

- a. Signal: Two-way radios will not be used within 50 feet of an area suspected to contain a bomb.
- b. Command: Primary Command Post is the EOC (Ext ____). Alternate Command Post is the _____.

OFFICIAL:

XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX
 XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX
 The Adjutant General

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
 XXXXXXXX

ANNEX A

BOMB THREAT PHONE REPORT

Date and time call received _____

Exact words of caller _____

Remain calm and be firm. Keep the caller talking; ask these questions in order:

a. Where is the bomb? Exactly? _____

b. What does it look like? _____

c. What will make it explode? _____

d. How do you deactivate it? _____

e. When is it going to explode? _____

f. Why was it put there? _____

If building is occupied, inform caller that detonation could cause injury or death.

(A-1)

ANNEX B

CALLER IDENTIFICATION CHECKLIST

CALLER'S IDENTITY: _____

SEX: Male Female Adult Juvenile

APPROXIMATE AGE: _____ Years

ORIGIN OF CALL:

Local Long Distance Booth Internal (from within bldg)
(if internal, leave plug in board)

| | | | |
|-----------------|-----------|-------------|---------------|
| ___ Loud | ___ Soft | ___ Fast | ___ Slow |
| ___ Raspy | ___ Deep | ___ Distant | ___ Distorted |
| ___ Intoxicated | ___ Other | ___ Stutter | ___ Nasal |
| | | ___ Slurred | ___ Lisp |
| | | | ___ Other |

ACCENT:

MANNER:

BACKGROUND NOISE:

| | | | |
|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------------|
| ___ Local | ___ Calm | ___ Irrational | ___ Factory Machines |
| ___ Foreign | ___ Rational | ___ Incoherent | ___ Music |
| ___ Race | ___ Deliberate | ___ Emotional | ___ Office Machines |
| ___ Not local | ___ Righteous | ___ Laughing | ___ Mixed |
| | ___ Angry | | ___ Street Traffic |
| | | | ___ Trains |
| | | | ___ Animals |
| | | | ___ Quiet |
| | | | ___ Voices |
| | | | ___ Airplanes |
| | | | ___ Party Atmosphere |

FAMILIARITY:

___ Did Caller sound familiar?

___ Did caller appear familiar with building or area by his description of the bomb location?

ANNEX C

IMPORTANT POINTERS

1. Recent studies have shown that the safest approach to a bomb scare is not immediate arbitrary evacuation. Bombers with limited access very often place their devices close to outer entrances and exits. This means that instead of moving to safety, evacuating personnel may be moving closer to the bomb. It is therefore advisable in most cases that everybody stay put until the situation is quickly evaluated.
2. If the decision is made to evacuate, insure that personnel are evacuated to a previously chosen place of safety. Walls are the best barriers against blasts and areas that are sufficiently distant should be large enough so that personnel will not be in close proximity to glass windows or other large glass objects that could shatter.
3. The explosive potential of any bomb is difficult to ascertain, but the safest method is to assume that any bomb will affect two adjoining rooms to the bomb on all sides--above, below and each side. A safe area for evacuation and assembly of personnel is an area with protection against flying glass and other debris with a distance of at least 300 feet from the suspected item.
4. WHAT NOT TO DO:
 - a. DON'T ignore bomb threats.
 - b. DON'T touch suspected explosives.
 - c. DON'T move suspected bombs.
 - d. DON'T place in water.
 - e. DON'T turn suspected bomb.
 - f. DON'T cut or pull wires.
 - g. DON'T cut string, pull fuses or release hooks.
 - h. DON'T pass metallic tools near suspected bombs.
 - i. DON'T smoke near suspected bombs.
 - j. DON'T investigate too closely.

(C-1)

ANNEX D

PREPLANNING CONSIDERATIONS TO THE BOMB THREAT PLAN

1. During the inspection of the building, particular attention should be given to such areas as elevator shafts, all ceiling areas, rest rooms, access doors and crawl space and other areas which are used as a means of immediate access to plumbing fixtures, electrical fixtures and the like, utility and other closet areas, areas under stairwells, boiler (furnace) rooms, flammable storage areas, main switches and valves; e.g., electric, gas, and fuel, indoor trash receptacles, record storage areas, mail rooms, ceiling lights with easily removable panels, and fire hose racks. While this list of areas to be noted with particular emphasis is not complete, it is sufficient to give an idea of those areas where a time-delayed explosive or an incendiary device might be concealed.
2. Establish and enforce strict procedures for control and inspection of packages and materials going into critical areas.
3. Develop and enforce a positive means of identifying and controlling personnel who are authorized access to critical areas and denying access to unauthorized personnel.
4. Instruct all security and maintenance personnel to be alert for suspicious looking and acting people. All personnel should be alert for foreign or suspicious objects, items or parcels which do not appear to belong in the area where such items or parcels are observed.
5. Instruct all security and maintenance personnel to increase surveillance of all rest rooms, stairwells, areas under stairwells and other areas of the building to insure that unauthorized personnel are not hiding in or reconnoitering these areas.
6. Insure that doors and/or access ways to such areas as boiler rooms, mail rooms, switchboards, elevator machine rooms and utility closets are securely locked when not in use.
7. Check key control procedures to see that all keys to all locks are accounted for. If keys are in possession of personnel no longer in your employment, or keys cannot accounted for - locks should be changed.
8. Check fire exits to be sure they are not obstructed.
9. Check fire hose racks and fire extinguishers regularly to assure they have not been tampered with; i.e., hoses cut or exposed to acid and nozzles damaged.
10. Increase surveillance of receiving and shipping areas, garages and parking areas.

11. Assure adequate protection for classified documents, propriety information and other records essential to your operation. (A well-planned, properly-charged device could, upon detonation, destroy records which are vital to day-to-day operations).
12. Check perimeter fences/walls/barriers to assure a good state of maintenance and adequate clear zones. Post with "No Trespassing" signs.
13. Check all exterior and protective lighting for proper operation and adequate illumination.
14. Protect ground floor windows with heavy mesh, grill work, or protective glass.
15. Conduct daily check for good housekeeping and proper disposal or protection of combustible material.
16. Have on hand, or arrange for immediate procurement of sand, sand bags or mattresses to be used as shielding in the event an explosive device is located in the building.
17. Have flashlights or battery operated lanterns on hand, in the event electric power is cut off.
18. Install closed circuit television to monitor areas where a bomb might be placed.
19. Install metal detecting devices.
20. Post signs indicating the use of closed circuit televisions and other detection devices.
21. Entrances and exits to and from buildings could possibly be modified, with a minimal expenditure of funds, to channel all personnel by a registration desk upon entering or leaving the building. Persons entering the building would be required to sign a register showing the name and room number of the person whom they wish to visit. Employees manning these registration desks could contact the person to be visited and advise that a visitor, by name, is present. The person to be visited may, in the interest of security and protection, decide to come to the lobby to meet this individual to ascertain that the purpose of the visit is in fact valid and official. A system for "signing out" when the individual departs the building could be integrated into this procedure. There is no question that the institution of such a procedure would result in many complaints from the public. On the other hand, if it were explained to the visitor at the registration desk that these procedures are being implemented in the best interest and perhaps protection or safety of the visitor, this might tend to reduce complaints.

EVACUATION CONSIDERATIONS

1. Determine who will evaluate the threat and make the decision to evacuate or not to evacuate.
2. Establish a signal for evacuation. The signal may be the same as that used for fire. There is one problem in this regard. Normal procedure in case of fire is to close all doors and windows. In case of a bomb explosion, this could increase damage. You should consider a voice announcement for evacuation under conditions of a bomb threat. The announcement must be made calmly. Personnel should be instructed to leave all windows and doors open and proceed according to the pre-established evacuation plan.
3. Establish priority and routes of evacuation based on the type of building and location of personnel within the building upon receipt of a bomb threat.
4. Consider priority and routes of evacuation in the event a bomb is found in the building. This also will depend on the type building and location of personnel in relation to the area where the bomb is located. In multi-story buildings personnel on floors above the danger area should be evacuated first. This can also be done simultaneously with the evacuation of lower levels.
5. If evacuation is ordered upon receipt of a threat, are personnel expected to return to work upon completion of the search? Will they be dismissed for the remainder of the day, with pay?
6. Who makes the decision to permit re-entry into the building following a search in which no bomb was found?
7. If evacuation is ordered and personnel held on standby pending completion of the search, an evacuation of "holding" area must be established and controlled. This area should be a distance far enough away from the building to protect personnel against debris, etc., in the event of an explosion.
8. Assume that a bomb threat is received, but evacuation is not ordered. During the search the bomb explodes with resultant injury or death.
9. Who controls entry into the building pending arrival of police?
10. If the building is evacuated should all electricity, gas, and fuel lines be shut off at the main switch or valve? (There is some diversity of opinion as to whether electric power should be shut off. To leave it on increases the possibility of electrical fires. To shut it off leaves the building in darkness and may tend to hamper the search team).

TELEPHONE PROCEDURES

Instruct all personnel to follow established procedures in the event a bomb threat call is received. These procedures should include:

- a. Keep the caller on the line as long as possible. Ask the caller to repeat message. Record every word spoken by the person making the call.
- b. If the caller does not indicate the location of the bomb or the time of possible detonation, the person receiving the call should ask the caller to provide this information.
- c. It may be advisable to inform the caller that the building is occupied and the detonation of a bomb could result in death or serious injury to many innocent people.
- d. Pay particular attention for any strange or peculiar background noises such as, motors running, background music and the type music and any other noises which might give a remote clue as to the place from which the call is being made.
- e. Listen closely to the voice, (male-female) voice quality, accents and speech impediments. Immediately after the caller hangs up, the person receiving the call should report this information to the person designated to receive such information (see Annex A and B).
- f. The information should then be reported IAW paragraph 3a and b. Sequence of notification should have been established during the planning phase.

PANIC CONTROL

Panic is defined as a "sudden, unreasoning, hysterical fear, often spreading quickly". Panic is caused by fear, although those involved may not know what they fear. People may be tempted to join a fleeing crowd; the fright of those in motion is enough to suggest the presence of something to fear. When this stage is reached, it may become difficult to control the group. Attempting to reason with such a crowd may be futile, but it may be possible to control the group by assuming leadership or distracting key members of the group. In any case, corrective action should be taken before the movement stage, if possible.

a. Panic Deterrents. An effective pre-emergency program of informing personnel what is expected of them in an emergency coupled with the example of strong, competent leadership by officers of the organization will go far toward preventing panic. To reduce the likelihood of panic, the physical causes of panic should be eliminated. In an emergency, the organization should be prepared to remove the injured and the dead from general view, clear away debris which appears to cut off escape; quickly control fire; and approach any disturbance with calmness. Pre-emergency preparation should include arrangements to facilitate routes to be taken in evacuating the building or going to shelter; and locating organization personnel where they can take command and give calm, decisive instructions at places where groups are likely to congregate.

b. Antidotes for Panic: In certain circumstances, it is conceivable that, despite pre-emergency preparations, an unorganized group may be on the verge of panic. Organization personnel should be prepared to deal with this in terms of the following principles:

(1) Provide Assurance. Exert positive leadership. Reassure the group by giving information and instructions calmly.

(2) Eliminate Unrest. Dispel rumors. Identify troublemakers and prevent them from spreading discontent and fear.

(3) Demonstrate Decisiveness. Suggest positive actions. Indicate what to do, rather than what not to do.

In summary, these are recommendations -- in final analysis of this entire complex problem, preparedness is the key.

1

2

3

APPENDIX F
US Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units (EODs)

36TH ORD DET EOD FT CLAYTON PANAMA
38TH ORD DET EOD FT STEWART GA
ORD DET EOD CP SHELBY MS
41ST ORD DET EOD FT BLISS TX
43RD ORD DET EOD FT KNOX KY
45TH ORD DET EOD FT POLK LA
47TH ORD DET EOD FT HOOD TX
515TH ORD CO REDSTONE ARSENAL AL
6TH ORD DET EOD FT SHAFTER HI
13TH ORD DET EOD FT DEVENS MA
17TH ORDE DET EOD FT CAMPBELL KY
18TH ORD DET EOD FT BRAGG NC
27TH ORD DET EOD FT LEWIS WA
34TH ORD DET EOD SIAD HERLONG CA
48TH ORD DET EOD FT JACKSON SC
49TH ORD DET EOD FT ORD CA
50TH ORD DET EOD GRANITE CITY IL
51ST ORD DET EOD FT SHERIDAN IL
28TH ORD DET EOD LEAD CHAMBERSBURG PA
52D ORD DET EOD PINE BLUFF AR
53D ORD DET EOD VANCOUVER BKS VANCOUVER WA
54TH ORD DET EOF FT MONMOUTH NJ
55TH ORD DET EOD FT DRUM NY
56TH ORD DET EOD FT INDIANTOWN GAP PA
57TH ORD DET EOD FT BELVOIR VA
60TH ORD DET EOD FT DIX NJ
61ST ORD DET EOD FT SILL OK
ORD DET EOD FT DOUGLAS UT
63D ORD DET EOD FT LWONARD WOOD MO
64TH ORD DET EOD FT BEN HARRISON IN
66TH ORD DET EOD CAPE CANAVERIAL AFS FL
67TH ORD DET EOD FT MCNAIR WASH DC
70TH ORD DET EOD FT ROSECRANS CA
71ST ORD DET EOD WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH
74TH ORD DET EOD FT RILEY KS
75TH ORD DET EOD SELFRIDGE AFB MI
77TH ORD DET EOD FT HUACHUCA AZ
67TH ORD DET EOD PSF SFRAN CA
89TH ORD DET EOD FT BENNING GA
94TH ORD DET EOD FT CARSON CO
123D ORD DET EOD FT RUCKER AL
137TH ORD DET EOD CCAD CORPUS CHRISTI TX
142D ORD DET EOF FT MCCLELLAN AL
143D ORD DET EOD SEAD ROMULUS NY
144TH ORD DET EOD FT MEADE MD
146TH ORD DET EOD USMA STEWART ANNEX NEWBURGH NY
147TH ORD DET EOD FT LEE VA
149TH ORD DET EOD EA AREA APG MD
176TH ORD DET EOD FT RICHARDSON AK

259TH ORD DET EOD FT IRWIN CA
542D ORD DET EODCC FT DIX NJ
543D ORD DET EODCC FT LEONARD WOOD MD
546TH ORD DET EODCC FT SAM HOUSTON TX
547TH ORD DET EODCC FT GILLEM GA
548TH ORD DET EODCC PSF SFRAN CA
549TH ORD DET EODCC FT MEADE MD

US Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units (EODs)

HQ AAC/LGMWE, Elmendorf AFB AK
21 EMS/MAEE, Elmendorf AFB AK
343 EMS/MAEE, Eilson AFB AK
HQ AFLC, Wright-Patterson AFB OH
2701 EOD Squadron, Hill AFB, UT
HQ ATC/LGSO, Lackland AFB TX
3700 SUPSQ/LGSE, Lackland AFB TX
HQ AFSC/LGMWE, Andrews AFB MD
6515 MMS/MAWMW, Edwards AFB CA
3207 MMS/MAWME, Eglin AFB FL
ESMC/SEL, Patrick AFB FL
HA MAC/LGSWO, Scott AFB IL
314 TAW/LGSO, Little Rock AFB AR
438 MAW/LGSO, McGuire AFB NJ
60 MAW/LGSO, Travis AFB CA
1606 ABW/RMEOD, Kirtland AFB NM
437 MAW/LGSO, Charleston AFB SC
1 SOW/MAEE, Hurlbert Field FL
1605 MASW/LGSO, Lajes AB Azores
435 TAW/LGSO, Rhein-Main AB, GE
HQ PACAF/LGWSE, Hickam AFB HI
HQ PACAF/IGILM, Hickam AFB HI
Det 1, 314AD, Yongsan Garrison Korea
15 FMS/LGMFX, Hickam AFB HI
8 EMS/MAEE, Kunsan AB Korea
6151 CAMS, Suwon AB Korea
51 EMS/MAEE, Osan AB Korea
3 EMS/MAED, Clark AB RP
43MMS/MAWD, Anderson AFB Guam
400 MMS/LGWX, Kadena AB, Japan
432 TFW/MAEE, Misawa AB, Japan
HQ SAC/LGWC, Offutt AFB NE
HQ SAC/IGOM, Offutt AFB NE
2 MMS/MAWD, Barksdale AFB LA
9 Strat Recon Wing/LGSX, Beale AFB CA
96 MMS/MAWD, Dyess AFB TX
28 MMS/MAWD, Ellsworth AFB SD
92 MMS/MAWD, Fairchild AFB WA
410 MMS/MAWD, K.I. Sawyer AFB MI
42 MMS/MAWD, Loring AFB ME
3902 ABW/LGSX, Offutt AFB NE
380 MMS/MAWD, Plattsburgh AFB NY
394 ICBM TEST SQ/MBWE, Vandenberg AFB CA
HQ TAC/LGWME, Langley AFB VA
HQ TAC/IGIMM, Langley AFB VA
HQ ADTAC/IGIMM, Langley AFB VA
1 TFW/MAEE, Langley AFB VA
4 TFW/MAEME, Seymour Johnson AFB NC
23 TFW/MAEE, England AFB LA
27 TFW/MAEE, Cannon AFB NM
31 TTW/MAEE, Homestead AFB FL

37 TFW/MAEE, George AFB CA
 49 TFW/MAEE, Holloman AFB NM
 56 TTW/MAEE, MacDill AFB FL
 57 FWW/MAEE, Nellis AFB NV
 58 TTW/MAEE, Luke AFB AZ
 67 TRW/MAEE, Bergstrom AFB TX
 147 FIG/MAW, Ellington AFB TX
 318 FIS/MACE, McChord AFB WA
 325 FWW/MAEE, Tyndall AFB FL
 347 TFW/MAEE, Moody AFB GA
 354 TFW/MAEE, Myrtle Beach AFB SC
 355 TTW/MAEE, Davis Monthan AFB AZ
 363 TFW/MAEE, Shaw AFB SC
 366 TFW/MAEE, Mt Home AFB ID
 HQ USAFE/LGWME, Ramstein AB GE
 700EODF, Aviano AB IT
 7005EODF, Ineirik AB TU
 7006EODF, Kapaun AS GE
 7007EODF, Spangdahlem AB GE
 7008EODF, Lakenheath AB UK
 7009EODF, Torrejon AB SP
 7015EODF, Hahn AB GE
 7016EODF, RAF Croughton UK
 HQ AFOTEC/LGMW, Kirtland AFB, NM
 HQ United States Air Force/LEYWC, Wash DC
 HQ AD/YQO, Eglin AFB, FL
 USAF TAWC/THLAB, Eglin AFB, FL
 DNA FC/FCPSM, Kirtland AFB, NM
 HQ Ogden ALC/MMW, Hill AFB, UT

Air National Guard Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units (EODs)

102 FIW/MAWE, Otis AFB, MA
107 FIG/MAWE, Niagara Falls
119 FIG/MAWE, Hector Field
120 FIG/MAWE, Great Falls IAP, MT
125 FIG/MAWE, Jacksonville IAP, FL
142 FIG/MAWE, Portland IAP, OR
144 FIW/MAWE, Fresno ANGB, CA
147 FIG/MAW, Ellington AFB, TX
148 FIS/MAWOD, Duluth IAP, MN
177 FIG/MAWE, NAFEC Atlantic City, NJ
191 FIG/MAWE, Selfridge ANGB, MI

US Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Flights

6401 EOD Flight Clark AB, Philippines
6402 EOD Flight Kadena AB, Japan
6403 EOD Flight Osan AB, Korea
6404 EOD Flight Suwon AB, Korea
6405 EOD Flight Kunsan AB, Korea
6406 EOD Flight Misawa AB, Japan
6407 EOD Flight Hickam AFB, Hawaii

APPENDIX G
U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP FIELD OFFICES

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| OFFICE | FT Monmouth MI Detachment |
| MAILING ADDRESS | MI Battalion (CI) East Coast 902d MI Group PO Box 180 FT Monmouth, NJ 07703-0180 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL | IAGPA-A-MO |
| AUTOVON | 992-4173/4174/4158/2120 |
| COMMERCIAL | (201) 532-4173/4174/4158/2120 |
| MSG ADDRESS | CDR MID 902D MIG (ECB) FT MONMOUTH NJ |
| OFFICE | New York City Resident Office |
| MAILING ADDRESS | MI Battalion (CI) East Coast 902d MI Group, Bldg 408 FT Hamilton Brooklyn, NY 11252-5900 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL | IAGPA-A-FH |
| AUTOVON | 232-4331/4388 |
| COMMERCIAL | (212) 836-4331/4388 |
| MSG ADDRESS | CDR RO 902D MIG (ECB) FT HAMILTON NY |
| OFFICE | FT Dix Resident Office |
| MAILING ADDRESS | MI Battalion (CI) East Coast 902d MI Group PO BOX 1048 Wrightstown, NJ 08562-9998 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL | IAGPA-A-DX |
| AUTOVON | 944-5054/5452 |
| COMMERCIAL | (609) 562-5054/5452 |
| MSG ADDRESS | CDR RO 902D MIG (ECB) FT DIX NJ |
| OFFICE | Seneca Resident Office |
| MAILING ADDRESS | MI Battalion (CI) East Coast 902d MI Group PO Box 93 Seneca Army Depot, Romulus, NY 14541-0093 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL | IAGPA-A-SA |
| AUTOVON | 489-8261/8423 |
| COMMERCIAL | (315) 585-4481/ext 8261 |
| MSG ADDRESS | SAIC RO 902D MIG (ECG) SEAD ROMULUS NY |
| OFFICE | FT Devens Resident Office |
| MAILING ADDRESS | MI Battalion (CI) East Coast 902d MI Group, Bldg 1451 FT Devens, MA 01433 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL | IAGPA-A-DE |
| AUTOVON | 256-2001/3530/3283/3735 |
| COMMERCIAL | (617) 796-2001/3283/3530/3735 |
| MSG ADDRESS | CDR RO 902D MIG (ECB) FT DEVENS MA |

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

Picatinny Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
902d MI Group, Bldg 173
Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, NJ 07801-5001
IAGPA-A-PI
880-2034/2068
(201) 328-2034/2068
SAIC RO 902D MIG (ECB)
PICATINNY ARS DOVER NJ

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

Atlanta MI Detachment
MI Battlion (CI) East Coast
902d MI Group
FT Gillem, GA 30050-5000
IAGPA-A-AT
797-5386/5387
(404) 363-5386/5387
CDR MID 902D MIG (ECB) FT GILLEM GA

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

OFFICE SYMBOL

Puerto Rico Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
902d MI Group
P.O. Box 34218
FT Buchanan, Puerto Rico 00934-5999
IAGPA-A-PR

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

FT Jackson Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
902d MI Group
FT Jackson, SC 29207-6020
IAGPA-A-JA
734-4776/7818
(803) 751-4776
SAIC RO 902D MIG (ECB) FT JACKSON SC

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

FT McClellan Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
902d MI Group
FT McClellan, AL 51243-6205
IAGPA-A-MC
865-3415/5135
(205) 238-3415/5135
SAIC RO 902D MIG (ECB) FT MCCLELLAN AL

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

Hunter/Stewart Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
902d MI Group
Hunter Army Airfield, GA 31409-5115
IAGPA-A-HS
971-5904/5032
(912) 352-5066
SAIC RO 902D MIG (ECB)
HUNTER ARMY AIRFIELD GA

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

FT Gordon Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
902d MI Group
FT Gordon, GA 30905-5671
IAGPA-A-FG
780-5183/2318
(404) 791-5183/2318
CDR RO 902D MIG (ECB) FT GORDON GA

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

FT Rucker Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
902d MI Group
PO Box 698
FT Rucker, AL 36362-5352
IAGPA-A-RU
558-3509/3503
(205) 225-3509/3503
CDR RO 902D MIG (ECB) FT RUCKER AL

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

FT Bragg Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
902d MI Group
PO Drawer 680
FT Bragg, NC 28307-5000
IAGPA-A-BR
236-4809/5519
(919) 396-4809/5519
CDR RO 902D MIG (ECB) FT BRAGG NC

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

FT Meade MI Detachment
MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
902d MI Group
FT Meade, MD 20755-5395
IAGPA-A-FM
923-3244/7430/4957
(301) 677-3244/7430/4957
CDR MID 902D MIG (ECB) FT MEADE MD

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

FT Monroe Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
902d MI Group
PO Box 217
FT Monroe, VA 23651
IAGPA-A-ME
680-3916/3722
(804) 727-3722/3916
CDR RO 902D MIG (ECB) FT MONROE VA

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

Aberdeen Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
902d MI Group
PO Box 388
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

OFFICE SYMBOL IAGPA-A-AN
 AUTOVON 283-3272/3600
 COMMERCIAL (301) 278-3600/2172
 MSG ADDRESS CDR RO 902D MIG (ECB) APG MD

OFFICE FT Belvoir Resident Office
 MAILING ADDRESS MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
 902d MI Group
 FT Belvoir, VA 22060

OFFICE SYMBOL IAGPA-A-BV
 AUTOVON 354-4688/2444/3325
 COMMERCIAL (703) 664-4688/2444/3325
 MSG ADDRESS CDR RO 902D MIG (ECB) FT BELVOIR VA

OFFICE FT Ritchie Resident Office
 MAILING ADDRESS MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
 902d MI Group
 FT Ritchie, Cascade, MD 21719

OFFICE SYMBOL IAGPA-A-FR
 AUTOVON 988-5007/5737
 COMMERCIAL (301) 878-5023/5007/5737
 MSG ADDRESS CDR RO 902D MIG (ECB) FT RITCHIE MD

OFFICE Redstone MI Detachment
 MAILING ADDRESS MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
 902d MI Group
 PO Box 8194
 Redstone Arsenal, AL 35808-0194

OFFICE SYMBOL IAGPA-A-RS
 AUTOVON 746-2816/2673
 COMMERCIAL (205) 876-2816/2673
 MSG ADDRESS CDR MID 902D MIG (ECB) REDSTONE ARS AL

OFFICE FT Knox MI Detachment
 MAILING ADDRESS MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
 Drawer F
 FT Knox, KY 40121-5630

OFFICE SYMBOL IAGPA-A-FK
 AUTOVON 464-7647
 COMMERCIAL (502) 624-7647/7450
 MSG ADDRESS CDR MID 902D MIG (ECB) FT KNOX KY

OFFICE Detroit Resident Office
 MAILING ADDRESS MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
 902d MI Group
 Selfridge, ANGB, MI 48045-5011

OFFICE SYMBOL IAGPA-A-SE
 AUTOVON 273-4106
 COMMERCIAL (313) 465-4107
 MSG ADDRESS CDR RO 902D MIG (ECB) SELFRIDGE MI

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

Chicago Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
902d MI Group
PO Box 67
FT Sheridan, IL 60037-5590
IAGPA-A-SH
459-2275/2202/2410
(312) 926-2275/2202/2410
CDR RO 902D MIG (ECB) FT SHERIDAN IL

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

FT Campbell Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) East Coast
902d MI Group
PO Box 565
FT Campbell, KY 42223-5000
IAGPA-A-FC
635-2168/2169
(502) 624-2168/2169
SAIC RO 902D MIG (ECB) FT CAMPBELL KY

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

Commander
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
902d MI Group
Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129-7103
IAGPA-C-CO
586-4258/4520/2609
(415) 561-4258/4520/2609
CDR MI BN (CI) WEST COAST 902D MIGP PSF SFAN CA

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

Resource Management Office
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
902d MI Group
Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129-7103
IAGPA-C-RMO
586-2031
(415) 561-2031

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

S-1/Adjutant
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
902d MI Group
Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129-7103
IAGPA-C-AG
586-4750/3257
(415) 561-3257/4750

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

S-2/Security Manager
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
902d MI Group
Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129-7103
IAGPA-C-SM
586-2697/2610
(415) 561-2697/2610

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL

| | |
|---|--|
| OFFICE SYMBOL | S-3/Operations Officer MI Battalion (CI) West Coast 902d MI Group Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129-7103 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL AUTOVON COMMERCIAL | IAGPA-C-OP 586-2419/4059 (415) 561-2419/4059 |
| OFFICE MAILING ADDRESS | Operations Branch MI Battalion (CI) West Coast 902d MI Group Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129-7103 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL AUTOVON COMMERCIAL | IAGPA-C-OP0 586-4058/4060 (415) 561-4058/4060 |
| OFFICE MAILING ADDRESS | Plans and Training MI Battalion (CI) West Coast 902d MI Group Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129-7103 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL AUTOVON COMMERCIAL | IAGPA-C-OPM 586-4060 (415) 561-4060 |
| OFFICE MAILING ADDRESS | Tech Support Branch MI Battalion (CI) West Coast 902d MI Group Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129-7103 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL AUTOVON COMMERCIAL | IAGPA-C-OPS 586-4062/4063/4290 (415) 561-4062/4063/4290 |
| OFFICE MAILING ADDRESS | S-4/Logistics MI Battalion (CI) West Coast 902d MI Group Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129-7103 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL AUTOVON COMMERCIAL | IAGPA-C-LO 586-4921/4895 (415) 561-4921/4895 |
| OFFICE MAILING ADDRESS | San Francisco MI Detachment MI Battalion (CI) West Coast 902d MI Group Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129-7109 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL AUTOVON COMMERCIAL MSG ADDRESS | IAGPA-C-SF 586-4742/4815 (415) 561-4742/4815 CDR MID 902D MIG (WCB) SFRAN CA |
| OFFICE MAILING ADDRESS | FT Ord Resident Office MI Battalion (CI) West Coast 902d MI Group PO Box 379 FT Ord, CA 93941-0220 |

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| OFFICE SYMBOL | IAGPA-C-OR |
| AUTOVON | 929-2900/5711 |
| COMMERCIAL | (408) 242-2900-5711 |
| MSG ADDRESS | SAIC RO 902D MIG (WCB) FT ORD CA |
| OFFICE | Sierra Resident Office |
| MAILING ADDRESS | MI Battalion (CI) West Coast 902d MI Group Drawer E, Sierra Army Depot Herling, CA 96113-0115 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL | IAGPA-C-SR |
| AUTOVON | 830-9438 |
| COMMERCIAL | (916) 827-4438/4586 |
| MSG ADDRESS | SAIC RO 902D MIG (WCB) SIAD HERLONG CA |
| OFFICE | FT Lewis Resident Office |
| MAILING ADDRESS | MI Battalion (CI) West Coast 902d MI Group PO Box 33115 FT Lewis, WA 98433-0115 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL | IAGPA-C-LE |
| AUTOVON | 357-2501/2313 |
| COMMERCIAL | (206) 967-2501/2313 |
| MSG ADDRESS | CDR MID 902D MIG (WCB) FT LEWIS WA |
| OFFICE | Anchorage Resident Office |
| MAILING ADDRESS | MI Battalion (CI) West Coast 902d MI Group PO Box 5529 FT Richardson, AK 99505 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL | IAGPA-C-AK |
| AUTOVON | 317-863-1106 |
| COMMERCIAL | (907) 863-1106 |
| MSG ADDRESS | SAIC RO 902D MIG (WCB) FT RICHARDSON AK |
| OFFICE | Los Angeles Resident Office |
| MAILING ADDRESS | MI Battalion (CI) West Coast 902d MI Group PO Box 551 San Pedro, CA 90731-0551 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL | IAGPA-C-LA |
| AUTOVON | 833-1607/1603 |
| COMMERCIAL | (213) 831-1607/1603 |
| MSG ADDRESS | CDR LA RO 902D MIG (WCB) FT MACARTHUR CA |
| OFFICE | FT Huachuca Resident Office |
| MAILING ADDRESS | MI Battalion (CI) West Coast 902d MI Group PO Box 688 FT Huachuca, AZ 85613-0688 |
| OFFICE SYMBOL | IAGPA-C-HU |
| AUTOVON | 879-2213/2214 |
| COMMERCIAL | (602) 538-2213/2214 |
| MSG ADDRESS | CDR RO 902D MIG (WCB) FT HUACHUCA AZ |

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

White Sands MI Detachment
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
902d MI Group
Drawer I
White Sands Missile Range, NM 88002-5505
IAGPA-C-WS
258-5021
(505) 678-5021
CDR MID 902D MIG (WCB) WSMR NM

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

Yuma Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
902d MI Group
USA Yuma Proving Ground, AZ 85364-9102
IAGPA-C-YU
899-2230
(602) 328-2230
SAIC RO 902D MIG (WCB) YUMA AZ

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

FT Bliss Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
902d MI Group
PO Box 6032
FT Bliss, TX 79916-0032

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

IAGPA-C-BL
978-2697
(915) 568-2697
CDR RO 902D MIG (WCB) FT BLISS TX

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

FT Sam Houston MI Detachment
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
902d MI Group
PO Box 8256
San Antonio, TX 78208-8256

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

IAGPA-C-SA
471-6671/6672
(512) 221-6671/6672
CDR MID 902D MIG (WCB) FT SAM HOUSTON TX

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

Tooele Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
902d MI Group
Tooele Army Depot, UT 84074-5007

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

IAGPA-C-TO
790-2374
(801) 833-2374
SAIC RO 902D MIG (WCB) TEAD TOOELE UT

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

FT Hood Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
902d MI Group
PO Box 5026
FT Hood, TX 76544-0026
IAGPA-C-FH
737-2507/2517
(817) 685-2507/2517
CDR RO 902D MIG (WCB) FT HOOD TX

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

FT Sill Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
PO Box 33028
FT Sill, OK 73503-0028
IAGPA-C-FS
639-2720/1206
(405) 351-2720/1206
SAIC RO 902D MIG (WCB) FT SILL OK

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESSOFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

Texarkana Resident Office
902d MI Group
Red River Army Depot
Texarkana, TX 75507-5000
IAGPA-C-TA
829-2344
SAIC RO 902D MIG (WCB) RAD TEXARKANA TX

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
MSG ADDRESSOFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

New Orleans Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
902d MI Group
610 S. Maestri Place, Rm 848
New Orleans, LA 70130-9998
ATTN: IAGPA-C-NO
SAIC NORO 902D MIG (WCB) NEW ORLEANS LA

OFFICE SYMBOL
MSG ADDRESSOFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

FT Leavenworth MI Detachment
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
902d MI Group
PO Box 3141
FT Leavenworth, KS 66027-0141
IAGPA-C-FL
552-2490/5202
(913) 684-2490/5202
CDR MID 902D MIG (WCB) FT LEAVENWORTH KS

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESSOFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

Ft Leonard Wood Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
902d MI Group
PO Box 197
Ft Leonard Wood, MO 65473-5880
IAGPA-C-FW
581-4715
(314) 368-4715
CDR RO 902D MIG (WCB) FT LEONARWOOD MO

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

15 July 1986

OFFICE
MAILING ADDRESS

ST Louis Resident Office
MI Battalion (CI) West Coast
902d MI Group
PO Box 1287
ST Ann, MO 68074-5287
IAGPA-C-SL
693-7515
(314) 263-7515
CDR RO 902D MIG (WCB) STL MO

OFFICE SYMBOL
AUTOVON
COMMERCIAL
MSG ADDRESS

U.S. AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
UNIT SUMMARY
(As of 1 March 1986)

HQ AFOSI Bolling AFB, Washington DC
HQ OL-A Indian Head, MD
HQ OL-B Randolph AFB, TX
HQ OL-I DOD Polygraph Inst, Ft McCellan, AL (Activated 1 Mar 86)
HQ OL-K USAF Special Investigations Academy, Bolling AFB, DC
HQ OL-P Pentagon (And various CONUS locations)
HQ DETS 1&2 CONUS Locations
OSI-EUR AFOSI Europe, Ramstein AB, GE

AFOSI District 1 Pease AFB, New Hampshire
Dist 1, OL-W Westover AFB, MA (RA), (Formerly Det 102, OL-W. Realigned
under Dist 1 HQ, Eff 1 Jan 86)

Det 0102 Hanscom AFB, MA
Det 0106 Loring AFB, ME
Det 0109 Griffiss AFB, NY
Det 0111 Plattsburgh AFB, NY
Det 0140 Pease AFB, NH

AFOSI District 4 Andrews AFB, Maryland
Dist 4, OL-B Andrews AFB, MD (MAJCOM REP, AFSC)
Dist 4, OL-C Wash, DC (MAJCOM REP, DMA) (Inactivated 18 Feb 86)
Det 0403 Dover AFB, DE
Det 0411 Bolling AFB, DC
Det 0412 New York City, NY
Det 0413 McGuire AFB, NJ
Det 0414 Ft Meade, MD
Det 0440 Andrews AFB, MD

AFOSI District 5 Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
Dist 5, OL-D Scott AFB, IL (MAJCOM REP, MAC/AFCC)
Dist 5, OL-E Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (MAJCOM REP, AFLC)
Det 0509 Wurtsmith AFB, MI
Det 0512 K.I. Sawyer AFB, MI
Det 0514 Chanute AFB, IL
Det 0515 Grissom AFB, IN
Det 0516 Scott AFB, IL
Det 0518 Newark AFS, OH
Det 0540 Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
Det 0540, OL-F Evendale, OH (APPRO - GE)

AFOSI District 7 Patrick AFB, Florida
Dist 7, OL-H West Palm Beach, FL (APPRO - PRATT & WHITNEY)
Det 0707 Homestead AFB, FL
Det 0709 Macdill AFB, FL
Det 0710 Eglin AFB, FL
Det 0711 Tyndall AFB, FL
Det 0712 Robins AFB, GA

Det 0712, OL-I Marietta, GA (AFPRO - LOCKHEED)
 Det 0716 Hurlburt Field, FL
 Det 0717 Moody AFB, GA
 Det 0721 Howard AFB, Panama
 Det 0722 Ft Buchanan, Puerto Rico
 Det 0740 Patrick AFB, FL

AFOSI District 8 Maxwell AFB, Alabama
 Dist 8, OL-D Birmingham Municipal AP, AL (RA)
 Det 0810 England AFB, LA
 Det 0811 Columbus AFB, MS
 Det 0812 Keesler AFB, MS
 Det 0813 Little Rock AFB, AR
 Det 0814 Blytheville AFB, AR
 Det 0815 Barksdale AFB, LA
 Det 0816 Arnold AFS, TN
 Det 0840 Maxwell AFB, AL

AFOSI District 10 Randolph AFB, Texas
 Dist 10, OL-B Kelly AFB, TX (MAJCOM REP, ESC)
 Dist 10, OL-C Kelly AFB, TX (AFCOMS REP)
 Det 1001 Bergstrom AFB, TX
 Det 1008 Goodfellow AFB, TX
 Det 1012 Lackland AFB, TX
 Det 1012, OL-D Fort Sam Houston, TX (RA)
 Det 1014 Laughlin AFB, TX
 Det 1016 Kelly AFB, TX
 Det 1018 Brooks AFB, TX
 Det 1020 Altus AFB, OK
 Det 1021 Dallas, TX
 Det 1022 Carswell AFB, TX
 Det 1023 Dyess AFB, TX
 Det 1024 Sheppard AFB, TX
 Det 1025 Reese AFB, TX
 Det 1026 Tinker AFB, OK
 Det 1040 Randolph AFB, TX

AFOSI District 13 Offutt AFB, Nebraska
 Dist 13, OL-B Offutt AFB, NE (MAJCOM REP, SAC)
 Det 1302 Ellsworth AFB, SD
 Det 1306 McConnell AFB, KS
 Det 1312 Minot AFB, ND
 Det 1313 Grand Forks AFB, ND
 Det 1314 Whiteman AFB, MO
 Det 1340 Offutt AFB, NE

AFOSI District 14 Lowry AFB, Colorado
 Dist 14, OL-B Peterson AFB, CO (MAJCOM REP, Space Command)
 Dist 14, OL-C Lowry AFB, CO (Polygraph) (Activates 1 May 86)
 Det 1401 Peterson AFB, CO
 Det 1402 F.E. Warren AFB, WY
 Det 1404 Hill AFB, UT

Det 1405 USAF Academy, CO
Det 1406 Kirtland AFB, NM
Det 1407 Cannon AFB, NM
Det 1408 Holloman AFB, NM
Det 1440 Lowry AFB, CO

AFOSI District 18 Norton AFB, California
Dist 18, OL-A Vandenberg AFB, CA (Technical Services)
Dist 18, OL-B Los Angeles AFS, CA (Space Division Rep)
Dist 18, OL-F Los Angeles, CA (Polygraph)
Det 1801 Edwards AFB, CA
Det 1801, OL-E Edwards AFB, CA (AFFTC Rep) (Activation Date TBD)
Det 1802 George AFB, CA
Det 1803 March AFB, CA
Det 1803, OL-D San Diego, CA (RA)
Det 1810 Vandenberg AFB, CA
Det 1811 Los Angeles AFS, CA
Det 1812 Nellis AFB, NV
Det 1815 Luke AFB, AZ
Det 1816 Davis Monthan AFB, AZ
Det 1817 Williams AFB, AZ
Det 1840 Norton AFB, CA

AFOSI District 19 Travis AFB, California
Dist 19, OL-C Presidio of Monterey, CA (RA)
Dist 19, OL-D Hickam AFB, Hawaii (MAJCOM Rep, PACAF)
Dist 19, OL-E Sunnyvale, CA (Polygraph)
Det 1901 Beale AFB, CA
Det 1902 Castle AFB, CA
Det 1904 Mather AFB, CA
Det 1905 McClellan AFB, CA
Det 1910 Treasure Island, CA
Det 1911 Hickam AFB, Hawaii
Det 1940 Travis AFB, CA

AFOSI District 20 McChord AFB, Washington
Det 2001 Fairchild AFB, WA
Det 2004 Seattle, WA
Det 2006 Malmstrom AFB, MT
Det 2007 Mountain Home AFB, ID
Det 2010 Elemendorf AFB, AK
Det 2011 Eielson AFB, AK
Det 2040 McChord AFB, WA

AFOSI District 21 Langley AFB, Virginia
Dist 21, OL-C Shaw AFB, SC (CENTAL Rep)
Dist 21, OL-D Langley AFB, VA (MAJCOM Rep, TAC)
Det 2101 Pope AFB, NC
Det 2102 Shaw AFB, SC
Det 2103 Charleston AFB, SC
Det 2104 Seymour-Johnson AFB, NC
Det 2105 Myrtle Beach AFB, SC
Det 2140 Langley AFB, VA

AFOSI District 42 Clark AFB, Republic of the Philippines
 Det 4201 Manila, RP
 Det 4203 Andersen AFB, Guam
 Det 4240 Clark AFB, RP

AFOSI District 45 Seoul, Korea
 Det 4502 Kunsan AB, Korea
 Det 4502, OL-A Kwang-JU AB, Korea
 Det 4504 Taegu AB, Korea
 Det 4506 Osan AB, Korea
 Det 4506, OL-B Suwon AB, Korea
 Det 4540 Seoul, Korea

AFOSI District 46 Yokota AB, Japan
 Dist 46,OL-T Tokyo, JA (RA)
 Det 4606 Misawa AB, JA
 Det 4607 Kadena AB, JA
 Det 4640 Yokota AB, JA

AFOSI District 62 RAF Uxbridge, United Kingdom
 Det 6202 Raf Lakenheath, UK
 Det 6203 Raf Upper Heyford, UK
 Det 6204 Raf Alconbury, UK
 Det 6205 Raf Bentwaters, UK
 Det 6206 Raf Chicksands, UK
 Det 6207 Raf Mildenhall, UK
 Det 6208 Raf Fairford, UK
 Det 6210 Raf Greenham Common, UK

AFOSI District 68 Torrejon AB, Spain
 Det 6801 Zaragoza AB, SP
 Det 6802 Lajes Field, Portugal
 Det 6803 Aviano AB, Italy
 Det 6804 San Vito Dei Normanni AS, IT
 Det 6805 Rome, IT
 Det 6806 Hellenikon AB, Greece
 Det 6807 Iraklion AS, Crete, GR
 Det 6808 Naples, IT
 Det 6809 Comiso AS, IT
 Det 6840 Torrejon AB, SP

AFOSI District 69 Ankara, Turkey
 Dist 69, OL-A Sinop AK, TU (RA)
 Det 6901 Incirlik AB, TU
 Det 6903 Izmir, TU
 Det 6905 Istanbul, TU
 Det 6940 Ankara, TU

APPENDIX H

REFERENCES

| | |
|--|---|
| DOD 200.12 | Protection of DOD Personnel Abroad Against Terrorist Acts |
| DOD C-2000.12-H | Handbook for Protection of DOD Personnel Abroad Against Terrorist Acts |
| DODR 5200.1R | Information Security Program |
| DODR 5200.2R | Personnel Security Program |
| Department of Defense Guidance Document of Protection of MAA/MSN/MILGP Personnel and Installations Against Terrorism (US Army Institute for Military Assistance, Ft Bragg, NC) | |
| AR 50-5 | Nuclear Surety |
| AR 50-6 | Chemical Surety Program |
| AR 190-10 | Security of Government Officials |
| AR 190-13 | The Army Physical Security Program |
| AR 190-14 | Carrying of Firearms |
| AR 190-18 | Physical Security of US Army Museums |
| AR 190-22 | Search, Seizure and Disposition of Property |
| AR 190-28 | Use of Force by Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties |
| AR 190-31 | Department of the Army Crime Prevention Program |
| AR 190-40 | Serious Incident Report (RCS CSGPA-1340) |
| AR 190-52 | Countering Terrorism and Other Major Disruptions on Military Installations. |
| AR 380-5 DA Sup/DOD 5200.1-R | Information Security Program Regulation |
| AR 380-13 | Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Nonaffiliated Persons and Organizations |
| AR 381-10 | US Army Intelligence Activities |
| AR 381-12 | Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA) and Deliberate Security Violations |
| AR 415-22 | Protection of Petroleum Installations and Related Facilities |
| AR 500-1 | Aircraft Piracy Emergencies |
| AR 500-50 | Civil Disturbances |
| AR 604-5 | Department of the Army Personnel Security Program Regulation |
| AFR 125-37 | The Resources Protection Program |
| AFR 205-1 | Information Security Program |
| AFR 208-1 | The USAF Anti-terrorism Program |
| FM 19-10 | Military Police Operations |
| FM 19-15 | Civil Disturbances |
| FM 19-30 | Physical Security |
| DA PAM 190-52 | Personnel Security Precautions Against Acts of Terrorism |
| NGR 190-11 | Physical Security of Arms, Ammunitions, and Explosives |
| ANGR 205-1 | |
| ANGR 208-1 | The US Air Force Anti-terrorism Program |
| NGR 500-50/ANGR 355-01 | Civil Disturbances Control Operations |
| NGB Study Group Report (15 Aug 80) | Counter Terrorism, Chemical Spills, Radioactive Incidents |
| TC 19-16 | Countering Terrorism on US Army Installations |

1

2

3

APPENDIX I
Report

This appendix is applicable to the ARNG only; ANG units and activities will comply with the provisions of AFR/ANGR 208-1.

I-1. General

Due to the increasing terrorist threat to the US Army, DA has implemented a reporting system to monitor terrorist threat conditions (THREATCONS) throughout the Major Army Commands. The requirement control symbol (RCS) for the THREATCON report is CSGPO-445.

I-2. Report

a. Effective immediately, all states will report any THREATCON with rationale to NGB-MS within 6 hours, followed by electronic message within 24 hours.

b. Bomb threats will be promptly reported to NGB-MS, Autovon: 227-2252 (AR 190-40).

15 July 1986

NGBP 190-1/ANGP 208-2

By Order of the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force:

HERBERT R. TEMPLE, Jr.
Lieutenant General, USA
Chief, National Guard Bureau

Official:

HARRY M. LESLEY
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Executive, National Guard Bureau

Distribution:

ARNG: B, C, and D

ANG: F